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THE CONNECTING AGREEMENT




Parties entering into legal transactions usually are not concerned with
the question of what law will be applied, or of what law they prefer to
apply. However, there are numerous instances, especially those involving
international transactions, where parties do not feel reasonably sure whether
domestic or foreign law will be applied by courts should litigation arise.
To prevent such uncertainty, parties resort to self-help and, by mutual
consent, add a clause to their main arrangement (basic transaction) which
establishes a contact (connecting agreement) with the legal system they
want to apply (lex voluntatis). This occurs most frequently in standardized
contracts' relating to transportation,2 banking,' marketing4 and many others.
In all fairness such undertakings by parties must be understood as an
eloquent indication of deficiencies of the present legal systems to cope
satisfactorily with problems arising out of the ever growing intercourse
between nations.' In view of this state of affairs it seems to be a fair
guess that the parties' choice of law is here to stay as a rational and uniform
device to solve conflict problems in this important segment of the conflict
law.
The problem of the connecting agreement is as old as the conflict
law itself." It is therefore not surprising to find that the questions involved
*D.U.J., University of Ljublijana (Yugoslavia); J.D., University of Chicago Law
School; Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. 2 RABFL, TEIE CONFLICT OF LAws, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 376 (1947).
2. E.g., the United States Lines Co. passenger ticket contains the following clause:
"All questions arising under this contract shall be decided according to the laws of tle
United States."
3. See Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders [1937] A.C.
500.
4. "All questions arising under this agreement on the credit issued in connection
herewith shall be determined according to the law of the State of New York," Charavay
& Bodwin v. York Silk Mfr. Co., 170 Fed. 819 (1909). A direct (car) dealer agreement
quoted in Cane v. Chrysler Corp., 80 F. Supp. 360 (1948), reads that it "shall be
interpreted and construed according to the laws of the State of Michigan."
5. Note, Commercial Security and Uniformity Through Express Stipulation in Con-
tracts as to Governing Law, 62 HAv. L. Rev. 647 (1949).
6. For history consult LOItEN-zN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
269 (1947); 1 LAINA, INTRODUCTION Au DlROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVi, CONTENANT TINE
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have been profusely discussed by writers,7 jurists and legislators. Neverthe-
less, there still seems to be a need for additional research. First of all,
an isolation of the phenomenon involved promises to shed new light on
many aspects now obscured by confusion. On the other hand, a consistent
separation of the effects of such an agreement on the conflict level from
.those on the level of the application of the law so chosen seems more
desirable than ever.8
II
Before entering into a discussion of the connecting agreement, it seems
appropriate to clear the field of some phenomena which are similar in
their effects, but which should not be confused with the object of this
study. This need will be evident the moment it is realized that the
underlying aim, viz., the choice by parties of the legal system applicable
to a transaction may be achieved in different ways. Not only is there the
direct agreement between parties expressly naming the law they want
to apply, the connecting agreement. There are other indirect methods as
well, such as (a) creation of other suitable contacts, (b) incorporation of
selected legal rules into the transaction and (c) submission of the transaction
to an otherwise incompetent court.
Parties to a transaction may influence or even decide the question of
the law that will apply. This may be done by adroitly manipulating those
factual circumstances of a transaction which are decisive contacts, according
to the controlling conflict law, in such a way as to make them point
toward the desired legal system.9  For example, parties will enter into
their contract within a country, the law of which they want to apply.
This is done in the expectation that the court will apply the rule of the
ETUDE HISTORIQUE. . . (1888); 2 NEUMEYER, DIE GEMEINRECHTLICHE ENTWICKLrNC
DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT-UND STRAFRECIITS BIS BARTOLUS (1916); MEIJERS, L'His-
tOIRE DES PRINCIPES FONDAMENTAUX DU 1)Rorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE .. ', 49 RECUEIL
DE Couns 548 (1934); and MOSER, VERTRAGSARSCLUSS, VERrRAGSCI.LTICKIEIT UflD
PARTEIWILE M IN'rERNATIONALEN OBLOATIONENRECHT 129 (1948).
7. A list of significant contributions should include: CALEB, ESSAI SUR LE P IN-
CIPE DE L'AuToNOMIE DE LA Vo.OnT EN DaOIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVEi (1927);
hAUDECK, DIE BEDEUTUNC DES PARTEIWILLENS IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECIT
(1931); Wigny, La ragle de conflit applicable aux contrats, tine solution transactionello,
73 REVUE 1)ROIT INTERN. LiscIsL. Comp. 677 (1933); Neuner, Die Ankniipfung im Inter-
nationaldn Privatrecht, 8 RABELS ZTSCnR. 81 (1934); BATIFFOL, LES CONFLITS DE Lois
EN MATIARE DE CONTRATS (1938); Cook, "Contracts" and the Conflict of Laws: "Inten-
tion" of tie Parties, 32 ILL. L. REV. 899 (1938), and An Unpublished Chapter of the
Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 37 ILL. L. REv. 418 (1943); Moser, op.
cit. supra note 6, and recently Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, I Am. J. ComP.
L. 341 (1952).
8. Documentation is available in MAKAROW, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT
DEE EUROPXISCHEN UND AUSSFREURP(TSCIIEN STAATENr (1929); MiteERs, RECUEIL DE
Lois MODERNES CONCERNANT LI DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt (1947) and in Yntema's
recent article, 345-348. Comparative law data are best collected in 2 RABtEL, Op. cit.
supra note 1, at 357.
9. "Unechte Verweisung" according to WIMnu, DiE BEDUTUNG DES MASSCE-
BLICITEN RECIITS IM INTERNATIONALEN VErRAGItSRECII (1944). Westlake's designation
of such maneuver as "to fix the situs of the contract, at a certain place" was adopted in
Scenan v, Philadelphia Warehouse, 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
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place of conclusion and will hold the law of that place controlling. Such
adaptation of contacts, staged with the intent to mold them in a manner
which will make the chosen law applicable, are usually discussed by courts
where these manipulations indicate a fraudulent intent (e.g., evasion of
usury statutes). 10
In many cases parties dispense with such actions and state in their
contract simply that it "shall be held and considered at all times and
places to have been made in the city of . ... "" Such an agreement on a
fictitious contact-in this case the place of conclusion-may be dealt with
by courts in different ways. One approach is to accept the fictitious
contact at its face value and, by disregarding the parties' probable intent
hidden behind such language, give it only such effect as it is due according
to the applicable conflict law. That means that in case the court should
adhere to the rule of the place of performance, a fictitious place-of-conclusion
contact would be disregarded. The second solution is to dismiss fictitious
contacts entirely and determine the law applicable by using contacts as
they really exist (the law of the place where the contract was in fact
concluded). A third possibility remains-to interpret the language of the
contract creating the fictitious contact as indicating the parties' intent
to make the law of such place applicable. This result was reached in the
case just cited.'
2
There is still another way to make an otherwise inapplicable law
operative in a given transaction. This may be done by simply including
the text of such law as a part of the very contents of the transaction, like
any other contractual provision. Such incorporation'3 of otherwise in-
applicable legal rules does not decide the conflict question, i.e., what legal
system will control the transaction as a whole. 4 This law is to be determined
according to the conflict law applicable and, as a rule, is not decided by
the mere insertion of legal rules into the transaction, in favor of the
respective legal system. An exception exists where the court finds such
incorporation to be a sufficient indication of the parties' intent1 5 to subject
their transaction to the legal system from which they borrowed the rules.
10. See 2 RABEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 408.
11. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 556 (1904).
12. Ibid.
13. This phenomenon is termed "transformation de dispositions ltgales en disposi-
tions conventionnelles" (LEWALD, R*cLEs CLENERALES DES CONIT1'S nE Lois 116 11941])
and "Obernanme des Inhaltes der abstraktcn auslindischen Norm in den konkreten in-
hindischen Vertrag" '(LEWALD, DAs DEurscnu INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECH1T 518
[1928], "recezione negoziale delle norme" MORELLI, ELEMENTI Di DRITTO INTERNA-
ZEONALE PRIVATO 43 [1946] and also Perassi (20 REVISTA DIR. INTERN. 519 [1928]);
"internreclitliche Vertragsausfillung" (NussBAuM, DEUTSCES INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
"IRECUT 247 [1932]), "materiellrechtliche Venveisung" (WIDMER, op. cit. supra note
9, at 60).
14. See DiCEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 587 (1949) and cases cited. Contra 2 RAHEL,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 392, because of allegedly undesirable results.
15. In Foubert v. Turst, 1 Brown ParI. Cas. 129 (1703), the court upheld a con-
necting agreement referring to the Custom of Paris, by interpreting it as an incorporation
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Such interpretation, however, disregards the fact that parties abstained
from entering into a full-fledged connecting agreement.'"
It seems appropriate to add that, in situations of a mere insertion
of otherwise inapplicable. rules, significant changes occur with respect to
such rules. First, by being transplanted into a transaction where they
otherwise would not apply, such legal rules shake off their varying degrees
of effectiveness. Imperative rules become pliable.'7  Second, subsequent
changes in the legal system after which such contractual dispositions have
been patterned do not affect the corresponding contract provisions, except
in cases of an express or implied agreement by parties to that effect.
Finally, such incorporated rules will be given effect only to the extent that
they are consistent with the imperative rules of the law controlling according
to the conflict law applicable.' In the light of this analysis it appears
untenable to identify the mere insertion of specifically stated rules borrowed
from a legal system otherwise inapplicable, with the parties' choice of law,
i.e., the connecting agreement, the latter being a complete substitute for a
contact designating the controlling legal system. Nevertheless, it is still
customary with many courts and writers to speak of every law applicable-
in the sense that it means "as much as if the Custom had been recited at large" which
"by no means involved an attempt to introduce foreign laws."
16. From the insertion of imperative rules, a connecting agreement in favor of that
legal system must not be inferred, German Reichsgericht, April 11, 1933 (8 RABEL'S
ZTSCHR., 1934, Sondh. 42).
The difference between a mere insertion of rules and the connecting agreement is
well established in some foreign jurisdictions. The French Code Civil, art. 1390 (1804),
for example, disallows a general reference ("stipuler d'une mani6re gtn&ale") in marriage
settlements to previous statutes, etc., leaving it open to parties to incorporate such provi-
sions by way of a complete insertion. The Italian Codice Civile, Art. 1381 (1865), and
the new, Art. 161 (1942), likewise prohibiting a connecting agreement in favor of some
otherwise inapplicable law ("patuire in modo generico"), permit parties, nevertheless,
"enunciare in modo conreto il contenuto dei patti". i.e., to incorporate any provisions of
otherwise inapplicable rules. It is interesting to note that such restriction was felt to be
unreasonable since the Corte di Cassazione, June 15, 1940, 8 CIURISPRUzENZA COMPARATA
DIRIrTO INTERN. PRIVATO 216 (1942) characterized the.underlying marriage settlement
as an obligation in order to make applicable Art. 6 of the Preliminary Dispositions (1865)
giving connecting contract full effect. See Morelli, Legge regolatrice del contratto di
matrimonio e volontd delle parti, id. at 219, and Perassi, Rapporti Patrimoniali fra conjugi
e volontd delle parti, 34 RIvISTA DIR. INTERN. 111 (1942).
It is interesting to note the recent French draft on conflict law (1951), see I AM.
J. Comp. L. 422 (1952), according the connecting agreement full effect with respect to
marriage settlements by providing that "The provisions of the marriage settlement relative
to property are governed by the law chosen by the contrasting parties" (Art. 38), without
referring to limitations expressly stated for contracts in general (Art. 57, see infra,
note 45).
17. On that important distinction between itns cogens (imperative, rigid, compulsory
law) and the ins dispositivum (pliable, facultative, subsidiary, stop-gap law), no more
unknown to our statutory law, see Rheinstein, Book Review, 37 CoL. L. REV. 327, 329
(1937) and 10 U. ov Cmr. L. REV. 466, 470, note (1943), and Lenhoff, Optional Terns
(jus dispositivurm) and Required Terms (ius cogens) in the Law of Contracts, 45 MicH. L.
REv. 39 (1946).
Exceptionally the effect described is advocated with respect to the lex voluntatis,
e.g., Cour de Cassation, May 15, 1935, 2 REv. CRIT. 463 (1936), with annotations by
Niboyet, where the court held that the imperative rules of the German law applicable
according to a connecting agreement became pliable (see also note 91).
18. Accord, Corte di Cassazione, Jan. 21, 1928, 20 RIvIsTA DI. INTERN., 514 (1928)
CONNECTING AGREEMENT
on whatever ground-as being incorporated into the contents of the re-
spective transaction."
Finally, parties may express their choice of law by agreeing to submit
their transaction to a judicial jurisdiction chosen with a view to its conflict
law, and through it to the substantive law so designated.2 0 Such submission
to jurisdiction (prorogation), once established within the jurisdictional rules
of the court, makes applicable not only procedural rules of such court, but
also the court's conflict law. In that manner parties may choose the
substantive law applicable insofar as the choice coincides with the alternatives
contained in the conflict law of the forum prorogatum.1 Not only do
conflict rules vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, offering parties a rather
limited leeway for their choice of the intended substantive law, but also
there are jurisdictions holding that a prorogation of a jurisdiction implies a
submission to its substantive law as well. 2  It is interesting to note that
recognizing the effect of inserted otherwise non-applicable rules "provided they are.
regardless of the fact that they correspond to a foreign law or custom, not contrary to
public policy and, more general, to some imperative provision of the Italian law."
19. Writers even now consider the connecting agreement to be but an insertion of
intended rules contained in the lex voluntatis (e.g., "'Ihe reference to the selected law is
merely a shorthand way of incorporating statutes and decisions which would clearly control
if written verbatim into the contract", 62 HARv. L. REV. 649 [1949]. Many courts still
use that language to designate a connecting agreement, e.g., "incorporating the provisions
of any foreign law within their contract" (lacobs, Marcus Co. v. Credit Lyonnais, 12
Q.B.D. 589 [1884]), or "les parties se sont ainsi appropri6es des dispositions desdites lois
en les incorporant aux stipulation intervenucs entre ellks" (Belgian Cour de Cassation, Feb.
4, 1936, 3 NOUVELLE REVUE 158 [1936]). The same goes for our courts, e.g., "The law
we are in search . . . is that which the parties have . . . incorporated into their contracts
as constituting its obligation". Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (18821, or, . . .
parties , . . may by agreement incorporate into the contract the laws of that State and
make its provisions controlling upon both parties .... ", Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193
U.S. 551, 554 (1904). That language was adopted in rather rare cases by the Reichs-
gericht, as e.g., in its decision Feb. 20, 1913, J.W. 553 (1913) where the court held that
a connecting agreement has "basically no other meaning than that parties instead of
inserting all additional rules intended to be applicable, into their contract, make them a
part of their contractural arrangement by a reference relating to the law applicable."
It is to be noted that the doctrine of incorporation is resorted to by the adversaries
of the connecting agreement, e.g., "It is quite true that civilized law will generally make
part of their obligations whatever the parties choose to incorporate into their promises.
foreign law like anything else. .. . The parties cannot select the law which shall control,
except as it becomes a term in the agreement, like the by-laws of a private corporation."
Louis Dreyfus v. Patterson Steamship Co., 43 F.2d 824, 827 (1930). This doctrine was
repeated of course in CGeri & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Ltd. 48 F.2d 115, 117 (1931), saying
that "People cannot by agreement substitute the law of another place; they may, of
course, incorporate any provisions they wish into their agreements-a statute like anything
else--and when they do, courts will try to make sense out of the whole, so far as they can."
20. Syke, Agreement in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign Courts,
10 LA. R. REV. 293 (1950); RIE-IZLER, INTERNATIONAI.FS ZIVILPROZESSRECIIT 293 (1949);
NEUNER, INTERNATIONALE ZUSTXNDIGICEIT 17 (1929); Rx,, DIE STAATIrCIIE ZUSTANDIG-
CEIT I. INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECn'T (1939); BERLINER, VEREINBARUNGEN OBER DEN
UERICITSTAND I I INTERNATIONALEN RECrSVERKEHR (1936).
21. NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONALo LAw 202 (1943); Nolde,
Anwendbares Recht und Oerichtsstand im Internationalen Privatrecht, ZTSCH. \TERGL.
RW 292 (1941).
22. E.g., English law. Cf. N.V. Kwik lloo Tong Handel Maatsch. v. lames Finley
[1927) A.C. 604; Ocean Steamship Co. v. Queensland [1941] 1 K.B. 402. Contra:
Reichsgericht, 6 CIURISPROBErNzA COMPARATA Dirt. TNT, PRtIv. 174 (1940); Eckstein,
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this jockeying to achieve the applicability of a particular law is expressly
prevented by the Convention on International Air Transportation (Warsaw,
1929) since Article 32 provides: "Any clause contained in the contract and all
special agreements entered into before the damage occurred, by which the
parties purport to infringe the rules laid clown by this Convention




One of the foregoing sections of this study contented itself with
merely indicating the dualism between the basic transaction and the con-
necting agreement. There are involved, in like manner, two legal systems
competing for control. Let us start our analysis with the latter aspect.
The legal system chosen by the parties' agreement may or may not
coincide with the law that would apply according to the controlling
conflict law in absence of such an agreement. Accordingly, in situations
of the latter kind there will always be two legal systems in the running.
One will be chosen by parties' agreement; and the other will be ready to
be applied where there is no such parties' agreement, the otherwise applicable
laW2 4 So in a jurisdiction where the usual conflict rule provides that the
law of the place where the contract is made shall apply, "unless the
contracting parties clearly appear to have some other law in view,"' 5 the
law otherwise applicable will be the law of the place of contracting. The
otherwise applicable law is by no means one and the same throughout
the legal world however. There is no general conflict rule relating to
contracts and supported by one or another pet contact, as for example
Beale's place of contracting or Zitelmann's nationality of the debtor.
On the contrary, every jurisdiction applies its own conflict law and will
determine the otherwise applicable law according to such rules. Conse-
quently, with regard to one and the same transaction there will be, in
principle, as many otherwise applicable laws both domestic and foreign,
as there are different conflict law systems in force.
Zustdndigkeit and Geriehitsbarkeit, die Proragation ausldndischer Gerichte, id. at 176.
The fact that foreign law is made applicable does not deprive Italian courts of their
jurisdiction, Corte di Cassazione, July 19, 1940, 8 GIURIsPUDENZA COMPAtATA DIxR. INT.
PRiV. 232 (1942).
23. 49 STAT. 3000. (1935).
24. That legal system is termed "predetermined law", 2 RABEL, Op. cit. sj pra note
1, at 394, "controlling" or "indicated law", Yntema, supra note 7, "an sich massgebendes
Recht", MELCIItOR," DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATItECHTS
(1932), "das an sich anwendbare Recht", LEWALD, op. cit. suPra note 11, "Ia loi norm-
alement compttente" (Swiss representative at the Hague Conference, see AcTEs, 278).
The very existence of such law is denied by some writers, e.g., NUSSBAUM, DrursCns
INTERNATIONAIES PRVATIEcEr 244 (1932) ("Abet ein solehes dem Parteiwillen priiex-
istentes Vertragsstatut gibt es nicht"); likewise MosER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 179. In
the affirmative Kayser, L'autonomie do la volontd en droit international Privd .... 58
CLUNET 39 (1931).
25. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 463, 490
(1899).
CONNECTING ACREEMENT
One of the main problems involved in the discussion of the parties'
choice of law concerns the relation between the otherwise applicable law
on the one hand, and the lex voluntatis at the stage of the latter's application
on the other. To sketch the problem only briefly, reserving a comprehensive
discussion for later (infra XI), the otherwise applicable law performs a
two-fold function. Not only does it serve as a stopgap law whenever
parties do not designate the applicable law, but also the same law is made
paramount to the lex voluntatis in many jurisdictions. The idea of a
paramount omnipresence of the otherwise applicable law dominates the
reasoning of those courts and writers who are unwilling to recognize any
additional conflict effects of the connecting agreement over and above the
limits set by the otherwise applicable law, i.e., of a mere incorporation.
The second problem, the symbiosis of both the connecting agreement
and the basic transaction, proves no less significant. It seems to be a fair
statement that the connecting agreement is similar to an agreement of
prorogation or arbitration. The prorogation is intended to establish the
jurisdiction of an otherwise incompetent court, and the arbitration clause
serves to create a basis for an otherwise unauthorized private adjudication.
The connecting agreement operates in a similar function in the area of
the conflict law, i.e., to make an otherwise inapplicable legal system apply
by force of a parties' agreement. In both situations the main object of the
agreement lies outside of the immediate substantive settlement of the basic
transaction and concerns itself with jurisdictional or conflict law effects,
both operating on different levels, It seems therefore appropriate to accord
the connecting agreement, in a similar way, an independent existence2 6
to the degree necessary to guarantee such parties' agreement effects con-
sistent with the applicable conflict law. This degree of independence will
be worked out later when specific problems are discussed (infra V).
IV
At this stage of discussion it seems appropriate to discuss the nature
of the connecting agreement.27  In the main, three theories have been
advanced.
First, there are authors who suggest that the connecting agreement is
26. E.g., Wigny, supra note 7, at 687, JEANPRETRE, LES CONFLITS DE LOIS EN
MATIERE D'OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTUELLES, SELON LA JURISPRUDENCE ET LA DOCTRINE
AUX ETATS-UNIS 151 (1936), HAUDECK, Op. cit. sura note 7, at 88, and MosER, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 236. Contra: BATIFFOL, op. cit. supra note 7, Neuner, supra note 7, at
103, and Rheinstein, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 136 (1951).
27. It is interesting to check the terminology used. Savigny coined the term "frei.
willige Unterwerfung unter ein drtliches Recht", 8 HEUTICES RoMIlSCHIEs REMIcT 110
(1848); JEANPRETRE, op. cit. supra note 23, uses "accord sur Ia loi applicable", Wigny,
supra note 7, "clause de la competence ltgale"; the Swiss Bundesgericht speaks of a
"Rechtsanwendungsklausel." Dessauer v. Schweiz. Lebensversicherungs-und Rentenan-
stalt, 71 BGE II 67 (1945). Neuner supra note 7, uses "kollisions-rechtllche Rechtsktir-
ung" and "Verweisungsvertrag"; GtzWlLLmt, INTERNATIONALPRIVATRECHT (1929) "Ver-
weisungsklausel" and 'VIDMER, Op. cit. suPra note 9, "kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung."
Professio iuris (Jeanpretre, Yntema) may not be correct since the term denotes a
declaration by a party in an early medieval court disclosing his nationality in order to
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a conflict rule.2  That position is not believed well founded, since a conflict
rile is a rule of law. The connecting agreement, containing the parties'
private choice of law applicable, is no more than a parties' transaction
based upon a permissive conflict rule.
Next, it is submitted that the connecting agreement is but a
localization2 of the basic transaction involved. It seems obvious, however,
that one must not speak of territorial contacts where parties pointed out
the law to be applied by expressly naming that country, unless one adheres
to an exclusively territorialistic idea of law-and even so, nothing may be
gained by emphasizing that view. It remains only to say that the effect
to be given such choice depends entirely upon the controlling conflict law.
Comparative data indicate that pooling different types of contacts, including
the connecting agreement, does not correspond to any existing or past
legal system.
The third position advanced is that the connecting agreement is a
party-created contact8 0 of a special transactional type, recognized by the
conflict law in all situations where it applies. It is true that some striking
differences are noticeable between the connecting agreement which creates
a contact with a legal system to be applied, and other contacts of a terri-
torial (e.g., place of conclusion, place of tort, place where a thing is located,
etc.), personal (nationality), or mixed nature (domicile). First of all, in
many jurisdictions there are limitations imposed upon the contacts to be
established through the connecting agreement. Only a limited number of
otherwise inapplicable legal systems may be made applicable in this way
(infra VII). These limitations obviously do not apply where other contacts
operate, since they point but one way. Moreover, they are considered
to be "natural" as they arise out of "unadulterated" facts of life. They do
not owe their existence to parties' conflict law speculations and, consequently,
cannot go astray. It is significant that while other contacts operate single-
handedly, in principle, the connecting agreement as a contact appears on
the scene regularly doubled with another contact-a subsidiary or even a
superior one.
In the light of the foregoing discussion the following observation may
be made. The connecting agreement creating a contact with the law
enable the court to apply his national law. Such declaration did not include any choice
of law by the party (except in its degenerated form) nor represented a parties' agreement
as to the law to be applied. Cf. I NEUmEYER, op. cit. sutpra note 6, at 147, and
MEIJFS, oP. cit. supra note 6, at 548. Stipulatio iuris (Rheinstein, supra note 26, at
134) sounds better.
28. Cf.'NussaAUN, DEurTSC.S INTERNAriONAL S PRIVATRECIIT 247 (1932); Mayer,
Zur Parteiautonornie als Kollisionsnorm, NIEM. ZrSCTR. INT. RECHT 103 (1931).
29. So BATIFFOL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 38, writing that 11 ous pensons que les
parties ne choisissent pas formellement la loi applicable, ellks localiscnt leur contrat, el le
juge en ddduit la loi applicable." For additional criticism, see MosER, op. Cit. supra note
6, at 244.
30. 1 ARMIWJON, Patcxs DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRuvA 194 (1947); WOLFF, Pam-
VATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2d ed. 1950).
CONNECTING AGREEMENT
chosen by the parties has but one source from which it may draw its
effects. This is the controlling conflict law, which alone will decide
whether or not such an agreement will be given effect, and if so, tinder
what conditions and to what extent. Consequently, there is no reason
to hold that the parties' choice of applicable law is an a priori determination
of the law applicable and contrary to legal logics.
V
Considered from the point of view of a given forum, its conflict law
and the otherwise applicable law designated by it, the connecting agreement
displays certain dynamics of which three types will be discussed.
A connecting agreement which, according to the applicable conflict
rule, takes the basic transaction out from the domain of otherwise applicable
foreign law and brings it into the realm of the forum's own substantive
law falls into the group of adhesive connecting agreements. An example
of this type would be a contract concluded abroad, and an action upon it
brought in a court adhering to the place-of-contracting rule. This court
would apply foreign law, but for the connecting agreement, thus making
the substantive law of the forum applicable.
That type of connecting agreement is apparently favored by courts as
they "will be only too glad if the parties . . . agreed that the law of
that court should apply," such attitude being based on the "natural
inclination of every judge to apply the law of his country."8 1  In such 'a
situation no restrictions are imposed nor safety measures applied to preserve
the eliminated but otherwise applicable foreign law. At least this is true
of English law.32 In other countries 8 such agreements will have to pass
the test of reasonable connection (infra VII). Failing to pass, they will
be exposed to one kind of restrictions or another in favor of the otherwise
applicable law. They may even be controlled to some specific law
declared paramount to the lex voluntatis as well (infra XI). Some jurisdic-
tions consider certain of their conflict rules to be imperative, i. e., not to
be changed by parties' agreement, and will accordingly decline to relax that
rigidity even in the case of adhesive connecting agreements. 4
The opposite result is intended in cases of privative connecting agree-
31. Wolff, op. cit. supra note 30, 422.
32. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns Co., [1894] A.C. 535.
33. Cf. Ncw YOR PERSONAL PROPERTY ACT, § 12(a) recognizing an adhesive con-
necting agreement concerning trusts, provided the personal property involved is situated
within the state. See Cavers, Trust Inter Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 lIARv. LAW
REv. 161 (1930) and LAND, TRUSTS iN THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1940). For a similar
provision relating to wills, see NEW YORx DECEDENTS' ESTATES LAW, § 47.
34. The German Kammergericht, Nov. 8, 1935, J.W. 52 (1936), declined to give
effect to a connecting agreement in an adoption contract, declaring German law applicable
instead of the otherwise applicable Soviet law, saying, "Even if there are foreign nationals
or stateless persons involved, no reason whatsoever exists for Germany to recognize a
private agreement departing from the legal rules mentioned" (i.e., from conflict law rules
contained in Art. 22 and 29 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code), since an adop-
tion "even if considered by German law a contract, is not a common type of a contract
created only by parties' expression of intentions .. "
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ments. 3 The otherwise applicable law would have been, according to
the conflict law of the forum, its own substantive law but for a parties'
agreement making some foreign legal system applicable. In such a situation
it is only natural that a much stronger opposition by the forum is to be
expected. 6 In many jurisdictions that adversity is shown by even more
penetrating controls retained in favor of the otherwise applicable domestic
law.
Finally, a third situation may develop where one foreign law, applicable
according to the controlling conflict law, is substituted for another foreign
law by force of a connecting agreement. That type may be termed a
neutral connecting agreement,
VI
It will be the object of the present section to observe the connecting
agreement in operation. Suppose that a court has to try a case involving
a sales contract concluded in Brazil, with Mexico as the place of performance,
and English law is chosen by the parties.
The first question facing the court will be the determination of what
law controls the very existence of the connecting agreement. Once the court
has found that legal system and decided that a connecting agreement
exists according to its substantive law, it will have to move to a second
problem. It must decide, according to its own conflict law, what effect,
if any, is to be given to the parties' choice of English law, and under
what conditions. In case the connecting agreement meets requirements
set up by the court's conflict law as to the effect of the choice, i. e.,
establishes an effective contact with the lex voluntatis, that choice will
be honored; and English law will be recognized as the controlling legal
system. Finally, the court will apply English law according to the rules
of the forum which govern the application of foreign law in general, and
of foreign law as lex voiuntatis in particular (infra IX).
The first question indicated, namely, according to what law will
the court ascertain the existence of the connecting agreement (e. g., its
substantive validity, interpretation, form, mistake, fraud), may be answered
in three different ways.
One suggestion considers the connecting agreement to be an inde-
pendent transaction entitled to an independent conflict status, separated
from the basic transaction. This means the court would determine the
35. GOTZWILLER, INTERNATIONALPRIVATRECIIT 1606 (1929), calls it 'Ausland-
sverweisung."
In Cope v. Wheeler, 41 N.Y. App. 303, 312 (1869), the intended effect is consid-
ered to be-importation of foreign law (". . . parties ...by a mere mental operation can
[not] import the law of another State into this for the purpose of altering. ... )
Only that type of connecting agreement is adopted by the final draft for a Uniform
Commercial Code (1952), see infra note 65.
36. Art. 1433 of the Cerman Civil Code contains a straightforward provision denying
parties the right to "establish a matrimonial regime by reference . . . to a foreign law",
except in a situation to be mentioned later, infra note 67.
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substantive law controlling the validity of a connecting agreement by
following contacts displayed by the agreement (e. g., the place of con-
clusion of the connecting agreement). Such reasoning would most probably
lead the court to apply the law of the place where the basic transaction
was concluded. Consequently, it would declare as controlling a law
different from that chosen by the parties as lex voluntatis. The controlling
substantive law, however, would probably coincide with the law otherwise
applicable,3 7 except in jurisdictions adhering to the place-of-performance
doctrine. That latter rule would point toward the lex fori, provided
the court properly dismisses the argument that the place of performance
of the connecting agreement is not different from that of the basic
transaction.
Another alternative is to apply the law chosen by the parties, the
lex voluntatisi8 This solution is adopted by the recent Draft Convention
on the Law on International Sales of Goods (The Hague, 1951),31 "Con-
ditions affecting the consent of the parties respecting the law declared
applicable are determined by such law" (Art. 2, 3). That solution is
recommended by pointing out that both the connecting agreement and
the basic transaction will be controlled by the same law. This is open
to serious objections. These may best be evaluated by considering that
the connecting agreement will be given full effect under that supposition,
even before establishing the existence of such an agreement, and the
effectiveness of the choice of law contained in it, unless the courts arc
willing to adopt a prima facie doctrine and admit the applicability of
the lex voluntatis on that ground. In addition, there always remains the
argument that a connecting agreement is intended to create certain effects
at the conflict law level in a given court; and it may achieve them only
according to the court's law, including its substantive law.
The better view seems to be that the law of the forumn40 shall control
the substantive requirements of the connecting agreement together with
its conflict law effects. The traditional idiosyncrasy displayed by some
European writers against that law has no rational grounds here.'
In passing it shall be added that some jurisdictions require the con-
necting agreement to be "bona fide4C 2 and legal." '  According to the view
37. In favor of that law 1 RARL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 85, "The prevailing view,
however, is that the law governing in the absence of a settlement, controls the permissi-
bility of the settlement, including any agreement respecting the applicable law."
38. In favor of the lex voluntatis e.g., Neuner, supra note 7 at 103; against, e.g.,
MOSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 186.
39. For text, see 1 Art. J. Comp. L. 275 (1952).
40. MOSER, op. cit. su ra note 6, at 189; Yntema, supra note 7, at 356.
41. Zitelman, Frankenstein.
42. In Perrot v. Suchard Holding the Swiss Bundesgericht (75 GBE II 57, 1949)
applied American law as the lex voluntatis, including its provisions concerning limitation
although these rules are procedural, according to the lex voluntatis but not the lege fori.
43. Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 64 (U.S. 1838), etc.
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lere accepted these requirements must be met by standards set up by the
lex fori. The same goes for characterization problems involved. 44
VII
As pointed out above, two stages are to be distinguished in considering
the connecting agreement in operation. One is the conflict law stage
when the court will have to decide whether or not an effective contact
was established by the parties' agreement. The other stage is when the
law so chosen is being applied. According to the scheme of this study
a discussion will be undertaken now of the first aspect while the other
will be postponed until later (intra X).
With respect to their handling of the connecting agreement in that
first stage, countries will be grouped into three main classes. The first
will include jurisdictions which recognize the connecting agreement as
an effdctive contact with the lex voiuntatis, even if they differ with respect
to a more or less limited subsequent application of the lex voluntatis. The
second group will comprise countries making the conflict law effect of
such an agreement depend upon certain specified conditions. The third
type will represent countries declining to recognize parties' choice of law.
The list of countries recognizing the connecting agreement contains
all of Western Europe (France, 45 Germany,46 Italy,47 Switzerland, 48 Spain,49
44. Vita Food Products Inc. v. Onts Shipping Co. [1939] A.C. 277. Cf. Cook, 34
ILL. L. REv. 423 (1939).
45. For cases, see DONNrDEO DVE VABRES, 11., L'EvoLUrToNi DE LA JURISPRUODENCE
FRANCAISE ]IN MATIERE DE CONFLIT DES LoIs (1905), and DONNEDIRO DE VABRES, J.,
L'EVOLUTION DE LA JURISPRUDENCE FRANCAIS EN MATIERE DE CONFLITS DES Lois DEPUS
LE DEBUT DU XXE SIECLE (1937). Cf. also Kayser, L'autonornie de la volont6 en droit
international priv dans la Iurisprudence francaise, 58 CI.UNrET 32 (1931); BATIFFOL,
TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DaOIT IN1TERNATIONAL PaIv 566 (1949); Delaume, L'autono-
Mie de la volontd en droit international privd, 17 Rgvur CRIrQuE 321 (1950) and 5
NIBOYET, TRAITA im DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRiv* FRANVAIs 36 (1948).
The draft for a new CIVIL ConE (1950) adopts the parties' choice of law in stating
that ". , . contracts are, for their validity (conditions de fond) and their effect (effets
obligatoires) controlled by the law chosen by the contracting parties with a legitimate
interest in mind" (Art. 57), 1 AmE. 7. Comp. L. 424 (1952). See IHouin, Les travaux
de la Commission de rdforrne du Code Civil, 49 REV. raiM. 34, 41 (1951). It is rather
surprising to read that the draft "expressly rejects the so-called doctrine of the autonomy
of the parties", Delaume, A Codification of French Private International Law, 39 CAN. B.
REV. 721, 735 (1951). See also note 16 supra.
See the Legal Convention between France and Vietnam (1949) providing that "As
regards the validity and the effects of contracts, the applicable law is that to which the
parties intended to refer expressly or impliedly" (Art. 54). See Ponsard, The Conflict
of Laws arid Jurisdictions in the Recent Franco-Vietnanien Agreements, 79 CLUNET, 374,
447 (1951.
46. Re rule of parties' choice of law was developed by courts since the Civil Code
abstained, with purpose, from settling the problem. NIEMEYER, ZuR VoacESCmucITE
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATREciITS uis DEUTScIEN BURGERLICHtEN GESETZBUCH 329
(1915). E.g., "Es entspricht den far das internationale Privatrecht durch Wissenschaft
und Rechtsprechung herausgearbeiteten Regeln, dass bei obligatorischen Rechtsverhilt-
nissen far die Bestimmung des darauf anzuwendenden Reclites in erster Linie die Einigung
der Parteien beim Abscbluss des Vertrages entscheidend ist", Reichsgericht, Feb 12
1936, J.W. 1321, (1926). Cf. Lewald, Obligations en droit international privd allemanc,
in 10 LAPRADELLE-NIBOYET, REPERTOIRE . .. 72 (1931); and WOLFF, DAS INTERNA-
TIONALE PRIVATRECHT DEUTSCHLANDS 115 (1949).
47. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346, where the crucial part of Art.
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Belgium, 0 the Netherlands,1 I)enmark, 2 Norway,5 3 Sweden,54 Greece,65
and Great Britain 6 with Canada and Australia). Thailand,57 China" and
Japan"9 have express statutory provisions to that effect, as do Morocco 0
and the Belgian Congo.6' The United States0 2 belongs to that group
though the growing emphasis on the reasonable connection doctrine
(infra a) indicates a trend toward a qualified acceptance.
25 is omitted, namely "... provided always that there is no different intent of the
parties." See McCusker, The Italian Rules of Conflict of Laws, 25 TULANE L. REv. 70
(1950); Neuhaus, Das Internationale Privatrecht im Italienischen Zivilgesetzbuch von
1942, 15 RAaELS ZTSCH. 23 (1949). For details, see Balladore Pallieri, l1 Principio
dell'Autonomia dei Contrenti nella Dottrina e ielia Legislazione Italiana, 1 Riv. ITAL.
DIRitro INTERN. PRIVATO E PRoc. 148 (1931); PACCIIONrI, DIRuTo INTERNAZIONALE
PRIVATo 323 (1935). Recent cases are discussed by De Nova, La itirisprudence Italienne
.... 17 REV. CRIT. 341, 353 (1950).
The most discussed Art. 58 of the Commercial Code (1882) is no longer in force.
For recent developments, see BALLADORE PALLIERI, DIRITTO INrERNAZIONALE PRIVATO
227 (1950); and MONAco, LEFFICACIA DELLA LECE NELLO SPAZIO 218 (1952). The
doctrine of reasonable connection is discussed with respect to Italian law by Serra, La
designazione della lex contractus in 3 Co.UxlIcAzIorI V STUnI, INSTITUTO DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE E STRANIERO DELLA UNIVERSITA DI MIILANO 177 (1950).
48. MOSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8 et seq.; also Nussbaum, American-Suiss Pri-
vate International Law, 47 YALE L.J. 186 (1947). A connecting agreement in favor of
American law is discussed in Perrot v. Suchard Holding, op. cit. sopra, note 44.
49. Trias de Bes, Conception du Droit International Priv6 .... RECUEIL DE CouRs
I, 651 (1930).
50. 2 Vos, LE PROBLE!,ME DES CONFLITS t Lois 541 (1947); Renard, L'Autonomie
de la Volont dans le Systame Belge de Droit International Priv6, 27 REvUE DROir trT.
Lk. Comp. (spec. issue 1950).
51. Offenhaus, The Private International Law of the Netherlands, 30 YALE LJ., 109,
121 (1920); Curtius, La Position Jurisprudentielle Nderlandaise en Mati&e de Loi Applic-
able aux Contrats, 18 REV. CRITIQUE 1 (1951). For a recent case (1947), see 77 CLUNET
922 (1950).
52. Giinter, Das Privatrecht in Diinemark, 14 RAIIELS ZTscHn. 142 (1940).
53. Hbgtun, Om Partenes Autonomi i den lnternacjonale Kontratsret, 19 Nonoisx
TIDDSSKRI T OR INT. REV. 139 (1950); GJELSVK, DAS INrERNATIONALE PRlVA'RECir
IN NOEWECEN (1935).
54. MICHALI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECOT CEMfASS SCHWEDI5CIIEMj REcnr IUNDO
SCHVEDISC11ER REClTSSPREctnUsC 284 (1947).
55. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346; also, Lambadarios, La Principe de
rAutonomie de [a VolortW en Droit International Privd Grec, 3 REV. HELL. DROIT INr.
95 (1950); VALINDAS, LE DROIT INTERNArIONAL Pnivt DANS LE ConE CIVIL ItELLANIQUE
95 (1949); Nicoletopoulos, Private International Law in the New Greek Civil Code, 23
TULANE L. REv. 452 (1949); Gogos & Aubin, Das Internationale Privatrecht in Criechis.
chen Zivilgesetzbuch von 1940, 15 RABELS ZTSCIIR. 240 (1949).
56. IDicLy, CONFLICT OF LAws 584 (1919), also Graveson, The Proper Law of
Commercial Contracts as Developed in the English Legal System in LECTURES ON THE
CONI'LICT OF LAws AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 1 (1951).
57. ACT ON CONFLICT Or LAWS (1939), § 13: "The question as to what law is
applicable in regard to the essential elements or effects of a contract is determined by the
intention of the parties to it ....
58. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346.
59. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 347.
60. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346. Cf. RIVIkRE, TRAITi DE DROIT
MAROCAIN 340 (1948).
61.For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346. According to the SOUTn-AFRICAN
NATIVE ADMINisTRATION, AcT, 1927, § 11(2) "Where parties to a suit reside in areas
where different Native laws are in operation, the Native law, if any, to be applied by the
court shall be that prevailing in the place of residence of the defendant" which rule did
not prevent the court in Thompson v. Zeba (1930) to find that there is nothing "which
would preclude the parties from agreeing that the customs of the tribe of which they
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International tribunals recognize the law chosen by parties' agreement
as a matter of course. 03
A qualified acceptance of the connecting agreement in certain countries
is based on two factors. One of them refers to the relation between the
basic transaction and the lex voluntatis (infra a and b). The other is
founded upon a specific conflict law status of the basic transaction
(infra c).
(a) The first qualification is represented by the requirement that the
basic transaction must have a reasonable connection with the legal system
chosen by the parties. That requirement seems to gain strength in the
United States" and is included in the recent Draft for the Uniform
Commercial Code (1952)1 5 On the contrary, the doctrine is repudiated
in English law.
are members should apply." Later (1943) an amendment was enacted that the above
rule shall apply "in the absence of any agreement between them with regard to the par-
ticular system of Native law to be applied to such suit or proceedings." Cf. LEWIN,
STUDIES IN AFRICAN NATIVE LAw 71 (1947), and Lewin, Conflict of Intertribal Laws,
61 So. AvR. L.J. 269 (1944).
62. E.g., Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 129
U.S. 397 (1889); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ilill, 193 U.S. 551 (1904). For state law, cf.
12 CORNELL L.Q. 286 (1927); 28 Ky. L.J. 70 (1939); 26 VA. L. REV. 969 (1940); 40
ILL. L. REV. 165 (1945); 14 Mss. L.J. 420 (1942); 12 So. CALIF. L. REv. 335 (1939);
also LEFLAR, A TREATISE ON THE ARKANSAS CONFLICT OF LAWS (1938) and additional
articles in 10 MINN. L. REv. 498 (1929); 17 NED. L. BULL. 361 (193t) 51 TIARV. L.
REV. 924 (1932); 10 TEXAs L. REV. 163 (1932); 20 IowA L. REv. 607 (1935) and
State Annotations to the RESTATEMENT. Cf. 112 A.L.R. 124 (1938).
The RESTATiM.ENT on this point is a mere statement of the doctrine of its author;
cf. Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J.
893 (1942) and Cook's articles cited supra note 7. The doctrine of the RESTATEMENT was
rejected in favor of the law as it is, i.e., of the parties' choice of law, American Machine
& Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., 82 F. Supp. 536 (1949).
63. Cf. Serbian Loan Case, July 12, 1929, Pub]. de Ia Cour, S&. A, Arr. No. 14.
As to Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, see Nigreanu v. Meyers Recucil des Decisions des Tribu-
naux Arb. Mix. 211 (1925); Wittenberg, Les Tribunaux Mixtes et le Droit International
Privd, 59 CLUN T 991 (1931); Lipstein, Conflict of Laws Before International Tribunals,
25 TRANSACTIONS CROTIUS Soc. 175 (1941); DROST, CoNTRACTS Ir PEACE TREATIES
177 (1948).
There are instances where a connecting agreement is included in a treaty, e.g., be-
tween the Soviet Union and Germany (October 12, 1925), Art. 7, "Legal acts of the
Trade Delegation consummated in Cermany which are binding on the U.S.S.R., and the
economic effect of these acts, shall be subject to German law and German jurisdiction
." Harvard Research in International Law, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 562 (1932 Supp.).
Similar provisions are included in treaties with Austria (1921), Denmark (1923), Latvia
(1927), Norway (1921), Sweden (1924, 1927), etc. Cf. Sch6ndorf, Der Rechtsinhalt
der Deutsch.Russischen Vertrdge vore 12.Oktober 1923, 2 ZTSCHR. OSTRUxOP. RECUT
3, 9 (1926).
On the general problem, see PLAISANT, LEs Rc.LES DE CONFLIT DE LOIS DANS LES
'URAIT s 274 (1946).
64. Nesom, Intention of Parties-the Requirement of Substantial Connection, 10 LA.
L. REv. 346 (1950).
65. Requiring "reasonable relationship to one or more states or nations in addition
to this state" viz., to a state where the Uniform Commercial Code will be in force.
It is respectfully submitted that the applicability of the Code does not rest upon the
mere existence of a "reasonable relationship" between the transaction and the state where
the Code will be in force, but is, on the contrary, conditioned upon the existence of one
of the specific contacts as enumerated in previous subsections of the same section (1-105).
Consequently, the Code, including its conflict rules, relating to connecting agreements,
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(b) The second type limits the parties' choice of law by listing contacts
in order to designate legal systems available to the parties' choice. An
example of this kind is the well known Polish statute providing, "The
parties may submit their contractual relation to the law of their country,
to the law of the domicile, to the law of the place where the transaction
was made, to the law of the place where the transaction is to be performed,
or to the law of the place where the thing is situated" (Art. 7). An
additional qualification is added with respect to the application of the
law so chosen (Art. 10) and will be discussed later (infra XI).
will apply only where the Code applies according to its own specific provisions, not only
on the basis of some "reasonable relationship" with that state, or, to use our terminology,
where the Code is the otherwise applicable law. Therefore the words "in addition to this
state" seem unfortunate and would be better omitted.
Similar doubts arise as to the wisdom of the last sentence of the same subsection (6)
providing that "In absence of an agreement which meets the requirements of this sub-
section, this Act governs." This language is probably intended to say that in situations
where there is no connecting agreement making some other law applicable, the basic
transaction will remain within the Code's coverage. This seems rather elementary. In
case the provision intends to say the court may not apply some other law on the basis of
a tacit or presumed "intention" of the parties, it would be preferable to say so.
Since the conflict rules of the Uniform Code are unilateral, in the sense that they
determine only the extent of the applicability of the law in question, the provision
relating to the connecting agreement is limited to privative connecting agreements (supra
V) and does not apply in situations where parties intend to enter into an adhesive con-
necting agreement, i.e., make the Uniform Code applicable where it does not apply
according to its own conflict rules.
It is, finally, interesting to note that the 1949 draft required such choice of law to
be in writing, but this unique provision has now been omitted (1952).
Cf. Caldwell, Choice of Law under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 LA. L. REV.
278, 290 (1950); Rheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
LAw & CONTEMP. PROa. 114 (1951); Goodrich, Conflict Niceties and Commercial Neces-
sities [1952] Wis, L. REV. 199, 206; E.M.Z., Uniform Commercial Code-Conflict of
Laws, 17 ALB3ANY L. REV. 4, 10 (1953).
The doctrine of "significant connection" is adopted also by the recent Czechoslovak
enactment on conflict law (1948), Art. 9, see 31 J. Come. LEG. & INT'L L. 79 (1949),
that requirement being combined with limitations upon the application of the law so
chosen (see infra XI).
66. Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A.C. 277; but see Boisse-
vain v. Weil, [1949] 1 K.B. 482.
67. ALLERHAND, WYH3OR PRAVA (1926); SIEDL.C K, ZAIOWVIAZANIA Z UAoV W POL-
SICIEM PRAWIE MIEz. PRYVATNEM (1936); Przybilowski, Crundprobleme des Interna-
tionalen Obligationenrechts, Ztschr. Ostrecht (N.F.), 552 (1938); Babinski, La Solution
des Conflits de Lois en Pologne, 58 CLUNET 18, 23 (1931).
The Polish rule is patterned after the revised draft for the BELGIAN CIvIL COnE
(1884), Art. 7 (3): "La facult6 accorde . . . aux parties contractantes ne pent avoir
pour objet que la loi nationale d'une d'entre elles au moims, la loi du lieu du contrat ou
]a loi du lieu o6 celui-ci doit 6tre excut6." 18 REXV. DROIT INT. LEG. COMp. 472 (1886).
Limitations of a similar kind are adopted in Art. 1433(2) of the GEmtIAN CIVIL
CODE (see suPra note 36) that "If the husband has his domicile abroad ...reference to
any law relating to matrimonial regimes in force at the place of such domicile is per-
mitted," and in Art. 22(2) of the Swiss Statute on Legal Relations of Settlers and Sojourn-
ers (1891) providing that "Succession may be subject to the law of the decedent's home
canton by a disposition mortis causa or by an inheritance agreement".
A choice in favor of only one law is offered in cases of options, as for example accord-
ing to a French law (1921), offering an option in favor of the French law where
otherwise local, id. Alsace and Lorraine, law would apply (Art. 10, 11); NIBOYET, CON-
FLIT ENTRE LES Lois FRANCAISES ET LES Lois LOCALES D'ALsACE ET LORRAINE EN
DROIT PRIVE 234 (1922). See also Camerlynk L'Option en Faveur de l'Application de la
Loi Francaise par les Contractants Annamites, I REV. INoOCnrIOISE 100 (1937).
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A variation of that type is the recent Benelux Draft for a Uniform
Conflict Code68 enumerating, like the Polish statute, permissible contacts
for the parties' choice of law, but at the same time admitting any other
contact justifying the parties' choice, provided that such "other surrounding
circumstances" are sufficient to show that the contract "belongs mainly
to the legal system of a particular country" (Art. 17).
(c) Some countries authorize parties' choice of law only in situations
where international, or multi-legal transactions are involved (i.e., transactions
showing contacts with more than one legal system). This type of limitation
prevails 9 in Austria, 0 and apparently in France. 7 Italy so provides in its
new Codice di Navigazione (Art. 9)."
In that connection it may be noted that countries with no uniform
municipal law (e.g., Poland"3 and Switzerland T4) authorize an unqualified
choice of any of their municipal legal systems.
68. For text, see I INT'L & CoMp. LO. 426 (1952).
69. A special qualification was controlling under the formed Italian Commercial
Code (1882), Art. 58, adopting, in principle, the law of the place-of-making doctrine,
but allowing choice of law by parties "subject to the same national law", which provision
was widely discussed. Cf. UDINA, ELEMENTI DI DiRrrTo INTERNAZIONALE PRivAro
ITALIANO 196 (1933).
70. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 345. Cf. WALKER, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 351 (1935).
Codes formerly in force in various Swiss cantons, patterned after Art. 36 of the
Austrian General Civil Code (1811), belong to this group, e.g., Aargau (Art. r11 ) Luzern
(Art. 27), Solothurn (Art. 6) and t3nterwalden (Art. 6). Other cantons, on the con-
trary, accept parties' choice of law without qualifications, e.g., Graubtinden (Art. 1),
Schaffhausen (Art. 5), Zug (Art. 4) and Zfirich (Art. 6). About Uri, see infra note 74.
71. Note the constantly returning proviso "si entre personnes de nationalit6 diffTr-
ente" contained in some of the leading cases, e.g., Cass. Dec., 5, 1910, 7 REVUE 395
(1911); May 31, 1932, 1 REv. CRiT. 909 (1934), and Dec. 28, 1936, 3 REv. CarT. 682
(1937). Cf. MOSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 56, 65.
72. "The employment contract of seamen, of persons employed in internal naviga-
tion and contracts of the flying personnel are controlled by the national law of the ship
or aircraft, except that in cases of a vessel or an aircraft of a foreign nationality there is
no different intent of the parties." According to the Report of the Legislative Commis-
sion (RELAzioNi 22) personnel employed under Italian flag or on Italian aircraft shall
be prevented from choosing any foreign law which choice would be available according to
Art. 25 of the Preliminary Dispositions (supra note 47). On the contrary, the connecting
agreement is authorized with respect to contracts, e.g., lease, of vessels and aircraft regard-
less of their national law (Art. 10, RELAZIoNI 28). Cf. Makarow, Das Internationale
Recht der See-und Luftschiffahrt irn Italienischen Schiffahrtsgesetzbuch, 15 RABELS
ZTSCIR. 50, 58 (1949).
The Hague Draft Convention on International Sales (1951, supra note 36) applies
only to "international sales of good" and a "mere declaration of the parties, relative to the
application of the law ...is not sufficient to confer upon a sale international character"
(Art. 1) which means that a sales contract, in order to be covered by the Convention,
must be international; however that notion is not defined.
73. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 346. Cf. Polish Supreme Court, April 6,
1932, 6 CIURIsPRUDENZA COMPARATA DIRITTO INTERNAZIONAIF. PRIVATO 109 (1940).
74. E.g., the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF URn (1928), Art. 99: ". .. Parties'
agreement as to the law to be applied does not bind the judge unless it concerns Swiss
('eidgendssisches') law."
The same rule is expressed in Burcier v. Lanuse, 3 Mart. o.s. 581, (La. 1815) refer-
ring to Art. 2 of Title V, Book III of the Louisiana Digest (1808) providing that "Hus-
band and wife may even stipulate that their matrimonial agreement shall be regulated
by the laws ...of any other state or territory of the union, as they deem proper. ...
Cf. Parker, Free Will in Conflict of Laws ..., 6 TULANE L. REv. 454 (1932).
CONNECTING AGREEMENT
It only remains to consider those countries which decline to recognize
the connecting agreement as a transaction creating conflict law effects.
Here, for obvious reasons, we find the Soviet Union" and some of its
satellites.76 Similarly, but for different reasons, the connecting agreement
is repudiated, or at least strongly curtailed, in a considerable number of
Latin-American countries"7 and in international conventions inspired by
them, e.g., Codigo Bustarnente" and the Montevideo Convention.
7 9
In a conceptualistic way the different solutions presented above may
be rationalized by observing that legal systems which admit parties' choice
of law consider their conflict rules, pointing toward the otherwise applicable
law, to be pliable in the sense that the effect of these conflict rules may
be eliminated by the parties' agreement selecting a different law to control
their transaction. In that situation the conflict rule designating contacts
to be followed with respect to such a transaction is given a mere stopgap
law effect, provided there is "no different intent by the parties" as to
the law applicable which would take precedence over the stopgap conflict
75. MAKAROV, PRfcxs DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE D'ArRaS LA L*CISLATION ET
LA DOCTRINE Russ s 278 (1932); LuNc, MNEZDUNARODNOE CASTNOE PRAVO (1948).
76. Branding the choice of law by parties as a product of the early liberalistic
capitalism, the Yugoslav writer BLAcoJEVIc, MEDJUNARODINO PRIVATNO PRAVO (1950)
states, after a rather confusing reasoning (pp. 356-357), that the lex fori should be
"deemed applicable (to contracts) unless it can be established that parties . . . agreed
to make another law applicable" (p. 358), all this within limits set by pliable conflict
riles (p. 356) relating, e.g., to the subject matter of a contract, to penal clauses, to the
place and time and of performance and to the acceptance of such performance, also relat-
ing to the rescision of the contract, etc. (p. 356). Such a possibility does not exist where
imperative conflict rules apply, as e.g., with regard to the interest rate, reduction of con-
tractual penalties, duress, etc. (p. 357). These rules are, apparently of little practical
importance since in Yugoslavia foreign commerce is state monopoly and administrative
rules prevail (p. 259).
77. E.g., COCK ARANCO, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO (Bogota
1952) citing Art. 202 and 205 of the Commercial Code, identical with that of Panama.
The Civil Code of Argentina relies on the place of conclusion (Art. 1205) and that
of performance (Art. 1210) exclusively; cf. 4 LLERENA, COWiCO CIVIL AacENTINo 312
(3d. ed, 1931); also Ruiz Moncada, Principios de Derecho Civil lnternacional lncorpora-
dos en el Legislacion Argentina . .t BOLETIN INST. DEaaECo CIVIL (Cordoba) 172
(1946). For historical background, see Romero del Prado, Fuentes de las Normas de
Derecho Internacional Privado en el Codigo Civil Argentino, 8 BOLETIN... 145, 194
(1943) (viz. Story, and to a much lesser degree, Savigny).
Similar attitude prevails in Colombia (Art. 20 of the Civil Code and Art. 202 of
the Commercial Code); ef. CAICEDO CASTILLA, 1 DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 257,
268 (1949); in Chile (Art. 1545 of the Civil Code, except Art. 113 of the Commercial
code according to which Chilean law will apply "provided contracting parties did not
agree otherwise," but only with respect to contract concluded abroad), 2 ALBONICO,
MANUAL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 97, 137 (1957); in Guatemala, of.
MATOS, CoRso DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRivAno 449, 460 (1941); and in Uruguay
(Art. 2399 of the Civil Code as amended in 1941), cf. Gallino, Las Relaciones Juridicas
Internacionales en el Codigo Civil Uuguayo, 6 REvIsTA ARCENT. DERCo INTERNA-
CIONAL 347 (1943).
On the problem in general, see Bustamente, The American Systems on the Conflict
of Laws and their Reconciliation, 5 TULANE L. REV. 537, 543 (1931).
78. 2 BUSTAMENTE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 194 et seq. (1934); also his
MANUAL DE DRECno INTERNACIONAL PRlVADo 267 (1941). Notice, however, Art. 190
of his Code. For text, see Yntema, supra note 7, at 347.
79. Treaty on International Civil Law (1940), see 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (1943
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rule. On the contrary, conflict rules are held to be rigid in jurisdictions
denying effect to connecting agreements. That is to say, such rules are
exempt by operation of law, express or implied, from any possible modifica-
tion in a specific situation by parties' agreement. a0
An attempt to discuss that aspect of the problem, inviting as it may
be, is most certainly bound to lead us far into still unexplored areas of
comparative conflict law. Our discussion shall be limited to an additional
observation here. This is that the imperative or pliable nature of a conflict
rule is in no way determined by the imperative or pliable nature of the
corresponding substantive rule of the same legal system, and even less
by the nature of the substantive law to which such conflict rule refers
to as being applicable.
THE LEX \VOLUNTATIS
Ix
In a connecting agreement parties expressly identify the legal system
which they intend to make applicable. In jurisdictions recognizing such
express intent to be a contact, that choice of law will take the place of
some otherwise operative contact; and the law so identified as applicable
will be the law to control the respective basic transaction.
In order to be a complete substitute for a contact (i.e., a means to
identify the applicable law by following certain features displayed by the
transaction involved), the connecting agreement must point toward some
legal system, like every contact.," First, in order to be accorded the
full effect of a contact, a connecting agreement must designate a body
of rules which is legal according to the constitutional law of the country
so designated. Second, there cannot be a complete conflict operation
where the parties' choice is directed toward rules not legal in character
(e.g., religious rules,82 normis established by private associations, etc.).
Snpp.). Note Art. 5 of the Additional Protocol (Yntema, supra note 7, at 348) and the
abstention by Peru from voting on Art. 37-39 of the Treaty relating to contracts, as con-
rieting with Art. VII of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code favoring the lex loci
contractus (cf. also Art. XIV).
80. A parallel problem arises in situations where parties intend to confer, by
mutual agreement, jurisdiction upon a court otherwise incompetent (prorogation, see
suPra 1I). Like in regard to the connecting agreement, some jurisdictions allow parties
to choose a court otherwise incomptent as they recognize the parties' choice of the law
applicable, apparently considering their jurisdictional rules to be pliable, while, on the
contrary, a few countries regard their jurisdictional rules as imperative. The first attitude
is noticeable in England and in most of the Civil Law countries; the latter position seems
to prevail in this country. It may be noticed that, at first glance at least, there is no
connection between these two positions.
81. As to a reference to a specific enactment, e.g., "As far as this insurance contract
contains no express stipulations, the provisions of the Cerman Law on the insurance
contract of May 30, 1908, should apply," see the Swiss case Dessauer v. Schweiz. Lebens-
versicherungs-tud Rentenanstalt, 71 BGE II 67 (1945) and I Scnws'.szERIscHEs
JAIlBUCH F. INTERN. RECHT 168 (1944).
82. Cf. Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y. Supp. 184 (1926), where
a marriage settlement (koshuba) according to Jewish religious law was agreed upon. The
court pointed out that such agreement "is not to be determined by the provisions of the
laws of any foreign state" since law may be created only by an independent state (citing
CONNECTING AGREEMENT
In both situations the question of which legal system is to control the
basic transaction still remains to be decided according to the conflict rule
applicable.
In addition, other specific questions arise. One of them is whether
or not parties may agree upon more than one legal system to control their
basic transaction. An answer in the positive 3 is not surprising. Quite
a few jurisdictions do not hesitate to apply different contacts to different
phases of a contractual relation and, consequently, different legal systems
(e.g., the law of the place of conclusion to questions of validity, and the
law of the place of performance to questions involving performance and
breach of contract). For the same reasons, by a connecting agreement
parties may choose the law applicable to only one legal aspect of the
basic transaction, leaving the rest to be controlled by the law otherwise
applicable. That possibility is expressly noticed by the Benelux Draft
describing the lex voluntatis as the law of some other country chosen to
control the basic transaction "wholly or in part" (Art. 17),
The problem of the inter-temporal law presents some difficulties.
They originate from the idea that parties, when choosing the lex voluntatis,
have before their eyes the law as it stands at that very moment. Such a
consideration will certainly lead toward an overemphasized concern for the
lex voluntatis as it appears at the time it is being referred to. That tendency,
however natural, must be disregarded. The contact established through
the connecting agreement is a submission of the basic transaction to the
lex volmtatis as a complete legal system, with its own rules of growth and
change. Therefore, the inter-temporal provisions of the lex voluntatis apply
as in cases where the applicable law is identified by means of other con-
tacts.84
A different rule may be advocated only in a situation where parties
Roche v. Washington, 19 Ind. 56, 81 Am. Dec. 376 [18621). Nevertheless the court
gave effect to the intent of the parties considering apparently the respective religious
rules to be incorporated into the agreement and not foreign law in the technical sense.
83. Cf. British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, 11910] 11 Ch.
354: "Again, different laws may apply to different parts of a contract if the parties so
intend"; French Cassation, May 15, 1935, 92 REvUE CanT. 463 (1935); and German
Reichsgericht, Nov. 14, 1929, J. W. 1855 (1930): 'Parties may intend the applicability of
a determined law with respect to one or another question involved or for all effects of
a transaction." Cf. similar language in Hamlyn v. Tallisker Distillery, [18941 A. C. 374.
84. Cf. In re Chesterman's Trust, [1923] 2 Ch. 466: ". . . the German law must
be applied as it is from time to time, and the creditors cannot take the law as it exists
at the time and claim that their rights must be regulated by its state, however, it may
be changed in the future." Accord, Belgian case, Feb. 4, 1926, 3 NOUvELIE REvuE 158
(1936): "Attendu que la soumission A un droit d6termin6 entraine en principe ]a son-
mission, non seulement A 1a ldgislation existante, mais aussi a toute modification de
celle-ci"; German case, Mar. 22, 1927, I.,. 1447 (1928), also Kammergerieht, Feb.
20, 1929, 3 RABrLS ZTsrnc. 62 (1929 Sondh.); Italian case, Mar. 6, 1940, 33 Rivis'rA
Din. IN1TERNAZ. 166 (1941). See Pan, Determinazione della legge regolatrice del con.
tratto e nutarnenti di tegislazione della legge del tempo del contratto, RTVIsTA Din.
PRIVATO 170 (1940). Contra: French Cour d'Appel, Paris, Apr. 24, 1940, cited in Ni-
BOYET, CoutRs DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL PRIvF 620 (1947), and the German case, Apr.
30, 1931, 6 RABELS ZTscHn. 63 (1932 Sondh.).
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expressly agree that the law as it stands at a certain moment shall apply and,
consequently, later amendments will remain inoperative. Shall this specific
intent of the parties be given effect? Two avenues of approach are indi-
cated by judicial rulings. One is that parties may not meddle with the
lex voluntatis and any reservations against later amendments in the lex
voluntatis should be disregarded completely s5 The other view would give
more weight to parties' express intent. It will be noticed, according to this
latter view, that parties did not unconditionally subject their transaction to
the law chosen in the sense that the contact so established may be con-
sidered a complete substitute for the necessary identification of the law
applicable. By inserting important reservations of this kind, parties, by
their own action, annihilate the conflict effect otherwise accorded such
parties' choice and reduce their agreement to a mere incorporation of the
designated law to be applied in its petrified form. Hence, such basically
limited application of a law will not fill the place of a full-fledged contact.
Instead, the applicable law will still have to be identified, since the parties
have left that question unsettled.80
The question of whether renvoi should be accepted in situations where
the law is made applicable by the parties' agreement is answered almost
unanimously in the negative. 7 This solution seems to be justified by the
intent of the parties. By means of a connecting agreement parties intend to
make the lax voluntatis applicable against the stopgap conflict rules other-
wise applicable. By so doing they certainly do not expect that their choice
of law will depend upon the conflict law contained in the legal system so
chosen. Thus, it can safely be stated that the contact established with the
lex voluntatis under a connecting agreement is intended to be a direct
reference to its substantive law. The exception is in situations where the
forum's internal conflict rules must be consulted prior to the application
of the lex voluntatis. Accordingly, in cases where the lex voluntatis is the
law of a multi-legal country, (i.e., a country with no uniform substantive
85. Accord, German Reichsgericht, May 28, 1936, J.W. 2058 (1936), declaring it
to be "Impossible to subject a contract to the law of a certain country and, simultaneously,
exclude a specific present or expected future enactment, except such enactment contains
only pliable law .... ," all this with respect to our Joint Resolution of 1934.
86. Accord, Belgian case, Feb. 4, 1936, 3 NOUVELLE REVUE 158 (1936): "Con-
sidering that the general and express language of the reference to New York law ex-
cludes any possibility of a limitation . . . [and] if the contracting parties intended to
exclude from coming into operation all limitations of any kind concerning that clause
(i.e. gold clause) by virtue of future enactments of this state, such parties could and
should have said so." Cf. also MOsER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 56, 58 and 150.
87. Cf. Dtcar, op. cit. supra note 56, at 581. The question is clarified expreusly in
Art. 2 of the recent Hague Draft Convention on International Sales (snpra note 36) by
stating that "A sale is governed by the internal law of the country designated by the
contracting parties."
Renvoi was followed, however, in Duskin v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp.,
167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948), and the lax loci damni applied, as determined according
to the conflict rules of the lax volurtatis, i.e., by the law of Pennsylvania. Cf. Note,
Choice of Law by Contractual Stipulation, 16 U. or Cti. L. REV. 157 (1948). Cf. Lip-
stein, The Proper Law of the Contract, 12 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 242, 255 (1937).
CONNECTING AGREEMENT
law with respect to the specific matter involved), internal conflict law will
be consulted in order to determine, first, whether federal or state law shall
apply as the lex voluntatis, and second, which of several state laws is
applicable according to interstate conflict law.
In concluding this section it will be convenient to notice situations
when the effect of a connecting agreement was apparently frustrated by
basic changes in the lex voluntatis, as for example by a revolution. The court
was faced with this problem in Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society.s8 There the parties stipulated Russian law was to control the
insurance policies involved. The court considered the subsequent Soviet
nationalization decrees to "have the same force and effect as if they had
been issued by the Imperial Government." The writer feels that in such
situations rules as to frustration of contracts should be considered in regard
to the connecting agreement, and that reasonable expectations of the parties
as expressed should be given fair consideration.
X
Once the lex voluntatis is identified, the process of its application starts.
In case the lex voluntatis happens to be the substantive law of the forum,
as a rule no difficulties may be expected. However, in cases where the
lex voluntatis is foreign law, the process of its application will differ con-
siderably from the routine rules governing the application of foreign law.
It is elementary that a foreign lex voluntatis will have to be proved as
prescribed by the law of the forum.80 Furthermore, such law will be checked
against what is called the public policy of the forum before being applied.90
In principle, the lex voluntatis will be applied as a body of legal rules,
and various degrees of its effectiveness will be honored according to its own
standards. This means that imperative rules will be given strict application,
while pliable rules will be handled as mere stopgap provisions; all this
according to rules contained in the same lex voluntaits. It seems that some
French and Belgian cases go the other way. As a matter of principle they
consider all rules contained in the lex voluntatis to be pliable. They reason
that the whole lex voluntatis was made applicable by virtue of a contract,
and rules referred to in that way must not be given greater effect than
plain contractual stipulations."'
Having thus discussed problems related to the lex voluntatis as a body of
rules, let us turn now to the problem of what area of the basic transaction
will be controlled by the lex voluntatis. Will it be broader or narrower as
compared with the law applicable by operation of some other contact?
88. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934).
89. Cf. lorvath v. Cunard Steamship Co., 103 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. N.Y. 1952).
90. This proviso is expressly restated in Vita Food Products v. Unus Shipping,
[1939] A.C. 277.
91. Cf. French Cour de Cassation, May 15, 1935, 3 REvuE CRIT. 463 (1936), and
the Belgian case, Feb. 2, 1936, Sirey 4.1 (1937). Cf. also Louis-Lucas, L'autonomie
de la volont en droit priv6 et droit international Privd, in ETUDES A LA MEMOIRE IE H.
CAP!TANT 469 (1937); DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, I., op. cit. supra note 45, at 543.
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The answer is plain. The lex voluntatis will cover the same area of the basic
transaction as would be covered by a law made applicable by operation of
some other contact. What is meant is this: Where, according to the con-
flict rule of the forum, the area of the lex causae (let us say, of the proper
law of the contract) would not control the capacity of the parties and would
leave that aspect to a special conflict rule (e.g., the law of the place of the
making), then such extent of the lex causac will also be followed with
regard to the lex voluntatis.
As indicative of the standard extent of the lex causae, the recent Hague
Draft Convention on International Sales may be quoted. It excludes
from its operation questions concerning capacity of the parties, the form
of the contract, the passing of the title, and the effect of the contract on
third parties (Art. 5). These questions are to be decided according to
municipal conflict law.
In principle, the basic transaction will be controlled by the lex volun-
tatis to the same extent as any other law would control if declared applicable.
This means that the lex voluntatis will cover questions concerning the very
existence of the basic transaction, as well as questions relating to its effects.
The basic transaction will retain its unity. There are, however, a few
jurisdictions limiting the area of the applicability of the lex voluntatis to
only one part of the extent otherwise covered by the lex causae. In situa-
tions where the lex voluntatis applies, these jurisdictions split the conflict
status of the basic transaction into two parts. One relates to its validity
and the other to its effects. With respect to the first component, advocates
of the doctrine of splitting refuse to recognize any effect of the lex volun.
tatis. Accordingly, they decline to test the validity of a transacition intended
to be governed by the lex voluntatis against that law. Instead, they consider
the otherwise applicable law in force (e.g., the lex loci contractus) in spite
of the parties' contrary intent. As a consequence, the extent to which the
lex voluntatis will control in such jurisdictions is restricted to problems
involving the effects of the basic transaction. A typical representative of this
doctrine is the Swiss Federal Tribunal? 2 Moreover, there are similar tend-
encies in other countries.9 3 Nevertheless, it may be safely said that the
doctrine of splitting the conflict status of the basic transaction remains an
exception.
XI
As a rule, the lex voluntatis replaces the otherwise applicable law com-
pletely, and no traces of the latter remain noticeable. However, it has been
92. For cases, see MOSER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 20. For recent criticism, see
Knapp, Vers la fin de la coupure gdn&ale des contract dans le droit international suisse
des obligations, 5 ANNUAIRE SOIssE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 83 (1948). Contra: German
Reichsgericht, Jan. 3, 1911, 3 RABELS Z'rscun. 778, (1929) and cases in 1 CIURSPRU-
DENZA COM ARATA i DIrnTTO INTERN. PRIVATO 112 (1932).
93. Compare the language in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Boseman, 84
F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1936) and repeated in Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir. 1951), that "Parties in contracting may adopt as a part of their contract the laws
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indicated in the present study that the application of the lex voluntatis
is curtailed in a few countries by what we call the paramount omnipresence
of the otherwise applicable law. Jurisdictions adhering to that principle
have developed different techniques of giving effect, in a greater or lesser
degree, to that preferred law. They may be placed in three groups. Two of
them rely upon the law otherwise applicable, while the third type dispenses
with that law and introduces in its place a special legal system.
The most consistent doctrine used to preserve the prestige of the
otherwise applicable law in relation to the lex voluntatis applies the lex
voluntatis, subject to any legal system that would control as the otherwise
applicable law, regardless of whether it is the law of the forum or some
foreign law. In practice this means that the lex voluntatis will be given effect
only insofar as it is compatible with the imperative provisions contained
in the otherwise applicable law. That doctrine was clearly formulated by the
Austrian Draft (1913) and later included in the Czechoslovakian Draft of the
Civil Code (1924)2 It permitted the parties to subject a transaction to a
legal system "insofar as such submission does not contravene the imperative
provisions to which the aforesaid relationship is generally subject by virtue
of the provisions contained in this chapter" (Art. 17) (i.e., among its conflict
rules). This doctrine was espoused by the recent Czechoslovakian enactment
on conflict law (1948) and combined with the reasonable connection rule
(Art. 9) .1 The doctrine of the otherwise applicable law as a control
permanently hovering over the lex voluntatis is also included in Art. 5 of
the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on International Civil law (1940)
and followed in the Benelux draft (1951). It states that "such intention
(i.e., in a connecting agreement) shall not have the effect of withdrawing
the contract from any imperative rules of the legal system with which it is
so closely connected as aforesaid" (Art. 17)26
of a state other than their own if not contrary to the law or public policy of the state
where the contract is made and to be performed." FIELD, OUTINES OF AN INTER-
NATIONAL CODE (1876) suggested to limit parties' choice of law to problems of "interpre-
tation," reserving problems of validity for the law of the place of conclusion (Art. 602).
The same rule was included in a few code drafts, e.g., for the Italian Civil Code
(1925) (Art. 13), Diena, Osservazioni sul progetto di riforma del codice, 6 ANUARTO
DrITo COlNI'ARATo (1932), also Ago, Le norme di diritto internazionale nel progetto,
23 RIvsTA DIRITTO INTERNAZ. 37 (1931); and the Greek draft (1936), Art. 30, but in
all instances the rule was later abandoned.
94. DAs BURCERLICIIE CESETZBUCH FUR DIE rfscccHosL.ovAKtscHE REPUBLIK,
0BERSETZUNG DES ENTwURFEs DER KOMMIssION --(1924).
A similar provision was inserted into the draft for a unified Slavic Code of conflict
law, submitted by Lapaine, Izenaceno Mednarodno Zasebno Pravo za Slovanske Drzave,
ZBORNIK ZNANSTVFNIH RAZPRAV 186 (1936), transl. in 2 ZTSCaR. OSTEUROP. RECIIT 677
reading as follows: "Contracting parties may subject their legal relationship to an in-
applicable legal system. In such cases the imperative rules contained in the law applicable
according to this Code must be given effect" (Art. 6). Cf. also 29 REVUE 873 (1935).
Cf. Battiffol, Public Policy and the Autonomy of the Parties: Interrelations between
Imperative Legislation and the Doctrine of Parties Autonomy, in LEC-rURES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 68 (1951).
95. See note 65, supra.
96. Contra: German Reichsgericht, Dec. 19, 1933, 6 GIURISPRUDENZA COMPARATA
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The second group is comprised of jurisdictions limiting the control of
the otherwise applicable law over the lex voluntatis to situations where the
otherwise applicable law happens to be the substantive law of the forun?: 7
"Within the limits of the internal law applicable according to Art. 39, 40
and 41 (of the present Code), the effects of contracts are controlled by the
law chosen by the parties ... " This is a quotation from the Romanian Civil
Code (1940, Art. 42) illustrating the control of the lex voluntatis by the
otherwise applicable law, as declared in Art. 39, 40 and 41 of the Code,
provided the law so designated is the internal law of Romania. 8
Similar effect is accorded provisions of the Warsaw Convention on
International Air Transportation (1929). According to Art. 32 any agree-
ment "by which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by this
Convention . . . by deciding the law to be applied . . . shall be null and
void."
Into the third group fall jurisdictions abandoning the law otherwise
applicable as a means of disciplining the parties' choice of law at this stage.
Instead of the otherwise applicable law they introduce a special legal system
to take paramount control over the lex voluntatis. The Polish statute on
private international law (1926) will serve as an example. As was pointed
out before (supra VII), by a connecting agreement parties may choose
one of the legal systems designated through contacts listed in Art. 7, while
the otherwise applicable law is indicated in the following article. This
law, however, does not control the application of the lex voluntatis. Instead,
"parties are subject . . . to special legal prohibitions declaring void legal
transactions contrary to them, in force at the debtor's domicile and (or?)
at the place where the obligation is to be performed" (Art. 10).
It is easy to realize that this refined system of multiple controls designed
to curtail the parties' choice of law is more an outgrowth of a theoretical
predilection in favor of the otherwise applicable law (and, indirectly, of
contacts of a territorial nature) than a legislative measure required by actual
needs of international commerce. It is therefore signiticant that the recent
Draft Convention on International Sales (The lague, 1951), after almost
)RITTO INTRNAZIONALE PRIVATO 226 (1940), and Eckstein, Ober Parteiautonomie, id.
at 226, summarizing German cases in the sense that imperative rules of the Iex voluntatis
control and not the imperative rules of the otherwise applicable law. Cf. also 0. L. G.
Karlsruhe, Oct. 12, 1933, id. at 228.
97. Fritsche, Die 6rtliche Reehtsanwendung auf dem Cebiete des Obligationenrechts,
SCHWEIZ, JUR. ZTC., 232a (1925), and Sausser-lall, Lx droit applicable aux obligations en
droit international privd, id. at 271a.
98. Translation in 34 RIvIsTA Dharrro INTERNAZIONALE 147 (1942); ef. also Laday,
Die internationalprivatrechtlichen Bestimmungen irn Entwurf cines biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buches fir Rumdnien, 6 RADELS Zrscna. 741 (1932).
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a quarter of a century of learned discussions,"" eliminated every vestige of
such doctrinal niceties. Instead, it adopted a plain and reasonable rule that
such contracts are "controlled by the law designated by the contracting
parties"-a solution indicative of a trend to follow. 00
99. The Sixth Hague Conference (1928) prepared three different drafts with regard
to effects to be accorded the connecting agreement. Without going into details of this
interesting discussion, it may suffice to note that Draft I was intended to limit the
application of the Convention to matters within the area of the pliable law (conflits en
matiere de regles suppl6tives); the Draft II would cover also situations where imperative
rules are involved, and Draft III tried to reach a compromise by making the Convention
applicable to situations where imperative rules are involved, but refused to permit parties'
choice of law in such situations. Cf. MER-GuEx-ALEXANDER, DIE SECHSTE SESSION DER
IIAACER KONFERENZ FUER INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 72, 77, 80 (1928).
A similar discussion went on, for quite a long time, within the Institute of Inter-
national Law. The Florence Session, ANNUATRE 289 (1908), adopted the position that
the lex voluntatis may apply only within limits of pliable rules of the otherwise applicable
law. The Hague Session, ANNUAIRE 50 et seq. (1925) discussed widely all issues involved,
and the following session, 3 ANNUAIRE 197 (1927), was able to adopt a proposal based
on the doctrine of the prevailing otherwise applicable law, with the lex voluntatis to be
effective only within limits set by such "loi unique." The 1937 Session of the Institute
(Luxembourg) discussed the same problem with respect to contracts of employment.
As to their validity the lex loci contractus prevails (Art. 2) while the lex voluntatis is
admitted only within limits of this "loi unique" (Art. 4) stating that "the interpreta-
tion of the contract with regard to its effects within the parties' free disposition ('qui
ddpendente de la volont6 des parties") is controlled by the law expressly or impliedly
designated by them" (Art. 4, par. 3). See also 2 RABEL, OP. cit. supra note 1, at 394.
100. Rabel, International Sales Law, in LEaUREs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 34 (1951); Robinson, Conflict of Laws in Contracts of Sale,
16 Go. L. J. 387 (1928).
